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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF BRAZIL'S CRUZADO
by
Werner Baer* and Paul Beckerraan**
On February 28, 1987 the Brazilian government announced a
"heterodox" inflation stabilization program, which rapidly came to be
called the "Cruzado Plan." It was intended immediately to stop an
inflation that appeared to be escaping control and seemed untamable
through orthodox stabilization policies. Although at first Cruzado
Plan seemed to succeed dramatically in eliminating inflation without
recessionary side effects, it failed by the end of 1986, as inflation
recovered, the external accounts collapsed and real growth sagged.
Does this failure reflect an incorrect diagnosis of the nature of
Brazil's inflation, which led to inappropriate policies? Or, was the
Cruzado Plan correct in conception, but incorrectly administered? And
if the latter was the case, did socio-economic forces stand in the way
of correct implementation?
This essay argues that the answers to these questions are rela-
tively straightforward. There is no question that "inertial" forces
played a fundamental role in Brazil's inflationary momentum, through
such dynamic processes as wage indexation, financial indexation, the
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crawling peg exchange rate, expectations formation, relative price
dispersion, and so on. The Cruzado Plan addressed these problems, but
it was fatally flawed by its incorporation of a substantial wage
increase. Whatever good the Cruzado Plan did was largely cancelled by
the inflationary wage shock. Matters were made worse by the persisting
public sector deficit, a relatively low exchange value of the Cruzado
on its launch, and then by the execution of the Plan: prices were
frozen in disequilibrium too long and monetary policy was too loose.
The wage increase was the essence of what went wrong, however.
Unfortunately, it may be that, given the government's political weak-
ness, the Cruzado Plan had to incorporate a wage increase. That is,
the competition for purchasing power that sustained the inflation
effectively required the wage increase.
To make this argument, this essay is divided into four sections.
The first section presents a brief background to the Cruzado Plan's
conception. The second describes the plan and its immediate impact.
The third section analyzes the distortions that developed and the
authorities' attempts to counteract them. The final section draws
conclusions on the reasons for the Cruzado Plan's collapse.
Background
The authoritarian regime which took power in April 1964 reduced
inflation gradually from an annual rate of about 100 percent to about
26 percent by 1973. It accomplished this through a self-consciously
"gradualist" approach, including standard fiscal measures, repressive
wage policy, and realignment of controlled prices. The introduction
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of indexed-1 inked government bonds helped finance a persisting, but
diminishing, public deficit with a minimum of money creation, and
later index-linked savings accounts helped further promote private
saving. After August 1968, a crawling-peg exchange rate stimulated
exports and engendered the 1968-1973 "miracle" period, in which the
economy grew at annual rates exceeding 10 percent.
The downward inflation trend was reversed in 1973. The GDP defla-
tor rose about 34 percent in 1974 and 1975, then 47 percent in 1976
and 1977. After dipping just below 40 percent in 1978, the inflation
rate rose to 55 and 90 percent in 1979 and 1980. From about 100 per-
cent in 1981 and 1982, the inflation rate rose to 150 percent in 1983
and over 200 percent in 1983 and 1984, and by February 1986 it reached
a yearly rate of almost 300 percent.
The resurgence of Brazilian inflation can easily be linked to a
well-known series of external and internal shocks, such as the 1973
and 1979 oil shocks, the world interest rate shock of the early
1980's, and such agricultural shocks as freezes and droughts. The
Brazilian economists who designed the Cruzado Plan argued that the
shocks led to genuine inflation, rather than once-and-for-all price
level increases, because of the rapid implantation of formal and
informal indexation in the economy. For a variety of socio-economic
reasons, Brazilian economic agents have increasingly proven able to
2
pass on price increases which affected them. The result was an
increasingly severe inflationary fight-for-shares process ". . . be-
tween firms, sectors, firms and unions, between classes, between the
public and private sector . . . and (this became) ... a mechanism
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for the transfer of income to the economically or politically stronger
3
sectors." The economists who designed the Cruzado Plan came to refer
to this process as "inertial inflation," intending to convey the notion
that inflation itself engendered inflation in a self -perpetuating pro-
cess. Inflation of this kind could prevail in both years of high
growth and recession; it had no connection with any Phillips curve
process.
Many Brazilian economists have contributed to the "inertial"
approach to inflation. Essential "foundation" contributions were made
by such writers as Ignacio Rangel [ A Inflacao brasileira , Rio de
Janeiro, 1963], Mario Henrique Simonsen [ Inflacao: Gradualismo x
tratamento de choque ; APEC: Rio de Janeiro, 1970], and Luiz Carlos
Bresser Pereira [ Inflacao e recessao ; Editora Brasiliense, Sao Paulo,
1984, with Yoshiaki Nakano]. Francisco Lopes has written extensively
since the late 1970's on the relationship between wage-setting and
inflation: drawing on an analytical framework originally set out by
Simonsen, he showed how inflation could perpetuate itself if labor
succeeded in recovering or exceeding its previous peak real income in
4
each wage adjustment. In his basic analysis, average labor and capi-
tal income shares are taken to be relatively unchanged from wage-
contract period to wage-contract period. Thus, as workers recover
their peak purchasing power at the start of each negotiation period,
prices must rise to restore the preceding period's relative share
structure, thus driving labor's purchasing power down over the course
of each period. The higher labor's previous peak income, the higher
the wage adjustment it will seek at the start of each period, and so
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the higher the wage pressure is likely to be. Economic agents may
attempt to defend themselves by securing more frequent price adjust-
ments. The more frequent the adjustment intervals, however, the more
rapid the price level must rise in order to drive real wages rapidly
down.
If economic agents generally act to restore and to maintain pre-
vious real income peaks, inflation may simply be regarded as the out-
come of ". . . desired peaks of real income of each and the structure
of average relative prices. It follows that if all agents adopt
stable rules of periodic adjustments to unchanging real income peaks
and relative prices don't change, the rate of inflation will remain
constant." Lopes concludes, accordingly, that all economic agents
must accept reductions in their real-income ambitions in order to have
inflation decline permanently and genuinely.
Lopes's policy recommendation was a "heterodox shock," which would
consist of a total price and wage freeze, with passive monetary and
fiscal policies.
Before the freeze, wages and controlled prices would be set to a
real value (when deflated by the new frozen price level) equal to pre-
sumable "equilibrium" values—e.g., their averages over the preceding
six to 12 months. The freeze would be temporary and would be followed
by a decompression involving gradually loosening price controls. In
the latter time period moderate price increases would be permitted in
order to correct for price distortions which arose with the price
freeze. By means of such a freeze, Lopes argued, the process by
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which inflation causes inflation would be interrupted, thus permitting
the economy "to start all over again" where inflation is concerned.
Lopes 's call for a heterodox shock was seconded in a celebrated
paper by Persio Arida and Andre Lara Resende (in the Williamson col-
lection). They set out from the premise that, over the course of a
severe inflation, economic agents come to think of their current and
future incomes in terms of purchasing power rather than monetary units.
This imparts a powerful inertial character to inflation, for it be-
comes natural and widely accepted throughout a society that each eco-
nomic agent set prices and income claims so as to maintain purchasing
power. Their insight led Arida and Lara Resende to propose an ingen-
ious stabilization scheme: a temporary freeze of real prices, not
nominal prices—or, put differently, substitution of the cruzeiro
purchasing power unit by a constant purchasing power unit (for which
they proposed the Brazilian Treasury's purchasing power bond unit). On
conclusion of the freeze, the purchasing power unit would be trans-
formed into the new monetary unit. The "Larida" proposal was dis-
cussed widely, and although the change of monetary unit was never
attempted, their arguments for a general price freeze were incorpor-
ated into the Cruzado Plan approach.
Events Leading to the Cruzado Plan
The severe recession of 1981-4 (see Table 1), which resulted from
the adjustment policies enacted to confront the external payments
crisis, had no impact on the inflation rate, although it did dramatic-
ally reverse the country's balance-of-payments position. It produced
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large trade surpluses, which resulted mostly from a pronounced decline
of imports, from almost US $23 billion in 1980 to US $15 billion in
1983, and US $13 billion in 1985. The contributions of export growth
to trade surpluses began only in 1984 (see Table 4a). Economic growth
resumed in 1984. It was at first the consequence of the rapid export
expansion. Beginning in 1985, it was based mainly on a notable
increase in real wages which generated a consumption boom.
The resumption of growth in an economy with widespread financial
indexation, a crawling-peg exchange rate, and wage indexation rein-
forced by resurgent labor militancy (a brief period of "80 percent
wage indexation" was ended in 1985) reinforced the intractibility of
the inflation. In late 1985 a drought caused a sharp rise in agri-
cultural prices. By early 1986, as the shock fed through the indexa-
tion system, the inflation rate seemed set to rise to unprecedented
levels. President Sarney's economic advisors, arguing that this
inflation could not be managed with traditional orthodox stabilization
programs, persuaded him to attempt a "heterodox shock."
The Cruzado Plan
On February 28, 1986, in a television address, President Sarney
announced Decree-Law 2283, intended to kill off Brazil's inflation in
a dramatic blow. The Decree Law (and its slightly revised version, DL
2284) imposed the following measures: 1) a general price freeze on
final goods prices; 2) a wage freeze following a readjustment which
set the new real wages at the previous six months' average plus 8 per-
cent, and 15 percent for the minimum wage; 3) application at the same
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to rents and mortgage payments, without the 8 percent increase; 4) a
wage-escalation system, which guaranteed an automatic wage increase
each time the consumer price index accumulated 20 percent from the
previous adjustment, or from each labor category's annual "base date;"
5) prohibition of indication clauses for contracts of less than one
year; and 6) creation of a new currency, the cruzado
,
which replaced
the old cruzeiro (1 Cz$ being equal to 1,000 Cr$). There was no spe-
cific reference in the decree laws to the exchange rate, but the
government indicated clearly that it intended to keep it fixed in-
9definitely at Cz$ 13.84 to the U.S. dollar. For contracts previously
made in cruzeiros
,
the Decree Law stipulated a conversion rate to
cruzados under which the cruzeiro would decline against the cruzado at
a monthly rate of 14 percent, i.e., the presumable expected monthly
inflation rate implicit in the contracts.
The Cruzado Plan clearly reflected the enhanced influence of
analysts who diagnosed Brazil's inflation as being mainly of the
"inert ial" type. They had wrested the balance of power over eco-
nomic policy in President Sarney's transitional civilian government
(in office since March 1985), from analysts who understood the infla-
tion problem in a more orthodox fashion and who had advocated more
traditional remedies. As the transition proceeded and directly
elected officials gained influence relative to those of the previous
regime, recessionary policies became increasingly difficult to insti-
tute for "political" reasons.
The success of the Cruzado Plan presumably hinged on the degree to
which the Brazilian inflationary process was mainly "inertial" in
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nature. To the extent that it resulted from an excess of aggregate
demand or insufficiency of aggregate supply, the Plan would not be
sufficient to bring inflation under long-term control. As Maia Gomes
stated, ". . . Several indicators suggested, already by the last
quarter of 1985, that formal and informal indexation could not fully
explain Brazilian inflation. For one thing, inflation was accelerating,
something that cannot be dealt with in terms of inertia . In addition
. . . the rate of capacity utilization was approaching 100 percent in
some industrial sectors . . . Evidence was also abundant that the
12
public sector deficit increased from 1984 to the end of 1935." In
fact, prior to February 28, 1986, the government had taken measures to
deal with presumable sources of fiscal and monetary imbalances. The
National Treasury budget and the so-called "monetary budget" (mainly
subsidy programs operated by the monetary authorities) were partially
unified in August 1985 to better control expenditures; in February
1986 the "movement account" of the Banco do Brasil, which enabled this
official commercial bank to create base money through an open Central
Bank "discount" facility, was frozen; in the same month a Treasury
Secretariat was created within the Finance Ministry to centralize
control over all public expenditures; and in December 1985 Congress
approved Law 7450, which substantially increased tax rates on finan-
cial transactions, required firms to file income tax twice a year, and
raised the personal income tax burden. Finally, days before the
introduction of the Cruzado Plan, the National Monetary Council
reduced the maximum time for consumer credit from 12 to four months
and tightened other rules relating to such credit.
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The immediate results of the Cruzado Plan were spectacular from
both an economic and a political point of view. The monthly inflation
rate as measured by the general price index declined from 22 percent
in February 1986 to minus 1 percent in March, a further minus 0.6 per-
cent in April, plus 0.3 percent in iMay, and plus 0.5 percent in June
(see Table 2). Meanwhile, economic activity, which had grown 8.3 per-
cent in 1985, and was still growing in January and February 1986,
accelerated. Industrial production was 8.6 percent higher in the
first quarter than in the corresponding 1985 period, and 10.6 and 11.7
percent higher in the second and third quarters respectively. Table
3(a) also shows that consumer durable production grew at astonishing
rates: annualized growth rates surpassed 30 percent in the months of
May to August. At least during the first few months following the
Cruzado Plan, the external accounts remained strong, with merchandise
trade surpluses running at US $1 billion a month (see Table 4b).
Superficially it seemed that Brazil had accomplished the trick of
running solid external accounts and maintaining spectacular growth
with rising real wages, diminishing unemployment and insignificant
inflation.
Emerging Difficulties and Contradictions
The point of the Cruzado Plan's price and wage freeze was to halt
inertial inflation. The wage increase and price freeze together
amounted to an incomes policy favoring labor (although, curiously,
Brazilian public opinion failed to perceive this at first, perhaps
because of the confusing multiplicity of policy actions). The Cruzado
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Plan's drastic nature, coming after an inflation which seemed increas-
ingly out of control, rallied the population behind the President,
with millions of citizens volunteering to serve as "Sarney's price
inspectors" to report on freeze violations. This popular enthusiasm
made an incomes policy feasible for a short period of time. Real
wages rose dramatically. Sao Paulo real average industrial wages were
9.1 percent higher in March than in February, and they rose a further
1.5 percent by November, when they peaked. The corresponding real
wage bill was 9.8 percent higher in March than in February, and peaked
a further 8.7 percent higher in November. Within weeks, however,
problems emerged, and rapidly intensified.
The Allocative Impact of the Price Freeze . One immediate conse-
quence of the freeze
—
perfectly anticipated by the Cruzado Plan's
economists, who urged the temporary sacrifice of the allocative system
to wring inflation from the economy—was that it eliminated the price
mechanism as allocator of resources. The longer the freeze lasted, of
course, the more serious the market distortions must become. Brazil's
inflation had not yet reached a "hyper" level at the time of the
freeze, so economic agents were still adjusting prices (or having
prices adjusted) at discrete, if relatively short, intervals. Thus,
on February 28 some sectors whose prices had risen just prior to the
freeze were in a favorable position compared with their recent real
averages, while others, which had planned to make adjustments a short
time thereafter, lagged behind. A study of 311 products revealed that
84 items were in the former category; 35 had price adjustments which
kept them at par at the time of the freeze; while 192 products lagged
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behind. The latter included milk, cars, meat, and various consumer
13durables (see Table 5).
Public utility rates, notably electricity, were caught notoriously
behind by the freeze. In the period February 1985 to February 1986,
for example, public utility rates in Rio de Janeiro increased by only
201 percent, while general prices rose by close to 270 percent. This
increased the deficit of the state public utility companies, placing
pressure on the government to subsidize both their current and their
capital expenditures. Capital expenditures could not be postponed if
bottlenecks were to be avoided as rapid economic growth continued.
While the Cruzado Plan economists agreed that the price freeze
would have to be temporary, they had reached no consensus about how
long it should last, since they did not know how long it would take
to reverse inflationary expectations. They appear to have been
thinking in terms of two or three months. They did fear, however,
that premature unfreezing could reintroduce inflationary expectations
and bring about renewed inertial conditions. As time passed, politi-
cal criteria came to dominate economic considerations: the price-
freeze component of the Cruzado Plan had become the basis of the
government's popularity. That is, zero inflation was increasingly
perceived by the President and his political advisors as the essence
of the government's economic success and adherence to it was there-
fore important as crucial November 1986 congressional and gubernatorial
elections approached. Since the Congress would also function as a
constitutional assembly with the power to determine the length of the
president's term of office, the President was anxious to preserve zero
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inflation as long as possible. Government economists argued for price
realignments as early as May 1986, and they were joined by the Finance
Minister in June 1986. They were overruled on political grounds, how-
ever.
Inevitably, there were widespread attempts to circumvent the
freeze. Brazil provided case studies for all the folklore of price-
control evasion, including raising prices by offering "new products,"
cheating on the content of packages, and requiring "side-payments" or
"premia" (in Portuguese, "agios ")
,
particularly for automobiles and
other consumer durables. Waiting lists for new automobiles swelled to
six months and more, although the wait could often be shortened appre-
ciably through appropriate "agio" payments. Products of all kinds
went into short supply, and shoppers' queues became increasingly com-
mon. Foodstuffs—notably milk and meat—became scarce as lower income
groups increased demand while producers reduced supply. In response
to complaints about shortages, the government pointed out that meat
had become a regular part of poorer people's diet for the first time,
even if they had to wait in line for it. Later in the year government
reached the point of confiscating some cattle in its well-publicized
struggle with meat producers. More effectively, it authorized in-
creased imports of foodstuffs. By cutting certain taxes and increasing
subsidies the government managed to increase supply without literally
raising prices—thus adding to pressure on public sector finances,
however. As the year went on, the inevitable problems caused by
frozen prices deepened, and the government's and populace's efforts to
enforce the freeze became more half-hearted and enfeebled.
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Excessive Growth . The Cruzado Plan resulted in a continuation
(and even acceleration) of economic growth, much of it based on
consumer spending. The high consumer spending was stimulated by the
substantial real-wage increases; the elimination of indexation from
savings deposits, which caused a large exodus from savings accounts
and largely into consumer goods; the price attractiveness of many
goods whose relative prices were lagging at the time of the freeze;
and the "wealth effect" resulting from the sudden change of infla-
14
tionary expectations which released funds for consumption.
As the boom continued in the months following the introduction of
the Cruzado Plan, many sectors were approaching capacity, with limited
short-run hopes of increasing it. In any case, entrepreneurs were
hesitant to invest in view of the deepening economic difficulties.
The estimates reproduced in Table 3b) show that industrial capacity
utilization was at a low of 71 percent at the beginning of 1984,
rising to about 78 percent at the time of the introduction of the
Plan, reaching 82 percent in the second half of 1986 (one source even
placing it at 86 percent). By January 1987, almost 60 percent of the
manufacturing sector was said to be operating over 90 percent of
i» 15capacity.
It is difficult to establish how large an increase in productive
capacity occurred during the time of the Cruzado Plan. The overall
low investment of the Brazilian economy in the mid-1980's was asso-
ciated with low saving rates. Whereas in the mid-1970's the investment/
GDP ratio had reached 25 percent, it declined to 16 percent in the mid-
1980's. The macro explanations for this trend lie in the severe
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recession of 1981-3, which was followed by the high rates of growth in
the mid-1980 's , based on consumer spending. It was also related to
the fact that Brazil became a net exporter of finance as it serviced
its enormous foreign debt. The debt service, given the low influx of
foreign finance in the mid-1980's, implied net external dissaving of
4 to 5 percent of GDP. Public investment had been cut in previous
stabilization efforts, and the price freeze only made it difficult for
many public utility firms to generate internal resources to finance
investment. Large private investment plans were discouraged by lin-
gering skepticism about the ultimate success of the Cruzado Plan and
by the uncertain position of firms caught behind by the price freeze.
Indeed, the frequent dramatic policy shifts per se—the frequent
changes in "the rules of the game"—were seriously discouraging pri-
vate capital formation.
There are indications, however, that the sales and production boom
which took place during the Cruzado Plan resulted in a substantial
amount of what may be described as "short terra" capital formation.
The output of capital goods in 1986 increased by 21.6 percent. Prelim-
inary figures indicate that Brazil's gross domestic capital formation
in 1986 rose to 19.6 percent of GDP. The high rates of consumption
growth appears to have forced many firms to invest in added production
capacity. This appears to have occurred mainly in the form of added
machinery rather than large scale construction of new plants. For
instance, in the year October 1985 to October 1986 the output of
machinery increased by 14.4 percent; but within the machinery sector
the biggest subsector growth was in textile machinery (30.1 percent),
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while heavy equipment production was less than 10 percent greater than
the year before. Waiting lists for textile and shoe machinery are
reported to have gone above 12 months.
The Public Sector Deficit . The role of the public sector deficit
in the Cruzado Plan's disintegration is a controversial matter. There
is a widespread view that the Cruzado Plan's fundamental flaw was its
lack of a fiscal control program. This view is particularly dear to
analysts who never sympathized with the inertial inflation diagnosis,
who believe that inflationary pressure can result only from fiscal
imbalances. In reality, the role of the public-sector deficit was
complicated. True, the Cruzado Plan per se incorporated no specific
tax increases or budget appropriation cuts. As noted above, however,
the government instituted a significant tax reform in December 1985,
which was expected to increase real revenues significantly over the
course of 1986. In addition, the government had taken steps to unify
the budget and to improve its monitoring. Moreover, the Cruzado Plan
itself had powerful favorable fiscal consequences (just as the subse-
quent resurgence of inflation had unfavorable fiscal consequences— it
is increasingly clear that the public sector accounts are a channel
for inflation feedback). The price freeze eliminated the well-known
"collection lag" problem: tax receipts based on prices and income
flows weeks or months earlier lose their real value against current
expenditures. The reduction of nominal interest rates and the fixed
exchange rate sharply reduced the public sector's massive "non-
operating" borrowing requirement, resulting from the effective
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inflation adjustment of the public sector's voluminous internal and
external debt.
More could have been done to improve the public sector accounts,
of course. More should have been done because public opinion thought
the deficit mattered, and public credibility was fundamental to the
Cruzado Plan's chances of success. The central government continued
to maintain large subsidy programs, which were not significantly cut
until June 1987. All organs of Brazil's government—federal, state,
municipal, public enterprise, the social security system, and decen-
tralized agencies—were (and are) widely believed to be badly over-
staffed, but political exigencies (and in a few cases the real needs
of government activity) made cuts impossible. The public sector wage
bill increased with serious consequences for public budgets; but that
was the consequence of the 8 percent wage increase, not of public sec-
tor policies per se . Certain state enterprises—notably the electri-
cal power sector—were caught by the price freeze with lagging output
prices, because their previous rate adjustments happened to have
occurred too long before. An overall public sector deficit accor-
dingly persisted after the Cruzado Plan. Given the conditions of
excess demand, this was inappropriate given the booming economy; con-
siderations of cyclical management called for a surplus. Neverthe-
less, this deficit cannot reasonably be blamed for the Cruzado Plan's
disintegration. The available evidence indicates that the overall
deficit cannot have been very large in the months just following the
Cruzado Plan. For reasons noted, the nonoperating part of the deficit
must have been virtually zero in these months. For the year 1986 as
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a whole, the operating deficit -the PSBR purged of the
inflation component —was 3.7 percent of GDP, of which
0.9
percent was the central government's, 0.5 was the states'
and municipalities', and B.3 percent was the state
enterpr ises'
.
The bulk of the operating deficit must have
been incurred at the beginning and end of 1986,
since these
were the months when prices were accelerating;
moreover,
seasonal pressures are strongest at the end of the
year.
Even if the operating deficit had beer, running at
anywhere
near 3.7 percent of GDP in the months following
the Cruzado
Plan, that could hardly have caused a triple digit
inflation
by itself. Consider the matter this way: the
economic grew
in real terms at more than 8 percent per year.
Suppose the
deficit ran at a steady < percent of GDP throughout
the
year. Supposing that the real income-elasticity
of money
demand was only one-half, that the monetary velocity
of
circulation had fallen to about 8, and the deficit had
been
fully monetized, the resulting inflationary pressure
would
have been about two percent a month - not "zero
inflation",
but tolerable, and well within the capacity of
the monetary
svstem to offset. x ~*
Inevitably, one's judgment about whether a public
sector deficit is inflationary is a function of one's
judgment about what it ought to be. If you believe that the
deficit ought instead to have been a 10 percent
surplus,
then the deficit was very inflationary. A budget
deficit
can always be improved; but this one was not the
essential
cause of the 1986 inflation. By comparison, assuming
that
labor's share of GDP was 55 percent in 1986, the B
percent
increase added <*.<* percent of GDP to labor income at a
-19-
On the Money Supply . One of the lessons the architects of Brazil's
Cruzado Plan drew from Argentina's Austral Plan experience was that
the public's willingness to hold money would rise sharply as a conse-
quence of declining inflation expectations, and that policymakers
would therefore be well advised to allow money supply growth in order
to forestall undue upward pressure on domestic interest rates.
Brazil's monetary authority saw an additional opportunity here. By
retiring outstanding index-linked government obligations, it could
reduce the future public sector debt service burden. The monetary
authority created a new "Central Bank Bill" to replace the index-linked
obligations it was not effectively monetizing. The new obligation
could be sold at a discount in the country's well-developed short-terra
open market system, further reducing the cost of servicing the public
sector's accumulated debt.
In introducing Central Bank Bills, the government was able to take
advantage of some of the basic practices of Brazil's open market system.
Brazilian public sector obligations are sold mainly to financial insti-
tutions who, in turn, finance their positions by accepting "overnight"
funds from the public. These "overnight" operations are collateralized
by the obligations. The Brazilian public prefers to maintain its
funds in short holdings because of the uncertainty of inflation and
interest rates: 60 day bank certificates of deposit are regarded as
virtually "long-term" by the average Brazilian portfolio manager.
Central Bank Bills yield the financial institutions the going over-
night rate plus a narrow spread, which is determined at the moment the
Bills are auctioned. The government secured financing at the lower
-20-
overnight rates, rather than the high indexed rates. The Central Bank
makes it a standard practice to intervene directly in the overnight
market, "placing" and "accepting" funds in order to manipulate the
overnight rate. Since the Cruzado Plan this has become the Central
Bank's basic monetary policy tool, used not only to influence liquid-
ity conditions throughout the system (including what is now described
as "indexation"—see below), but also to manipulate the government's
domestic borrowing charges. In 1987, "indexation" was restored by
linking longer-term securities to overnight LBC financing rate; the
Central Bank has manipulated the rate with a view to making it come
out equal to the average inflation rate.
Under the approach of increasing the money supply to meet pre-
sumably higher money demand, the money supply increased vertiginously
in the months following the Cruzado Plan. The narrow money supply
increased 80 percent in March alone.
The monetary accounts are tricky to interpret for this period,
since the imposition of reserve requirements on the Banco do Brasil in
February effectively reduced the monetary base, excluding Banco do
Brasil demand deposits. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a
sharp rise in the money multiplier—from 2.2 to nearly 3 on the new
definition—between February and March, and demand deposits nearly
doubled. The monetary base rose by about one-third in March, and by
another one-third in April, partly through continuing international
reserve inflows, partly through other purposely expansionary means.
The public clearly shifted its assets into money, as the theory
predicted; the ratio of the narrow money supply M to the broad
-21-
liquidity aggregate M, rose from about 8 percent to about 20 percent
over the course of 1986, before it plunged back again in the infla-
tionary explosion in early 1987. Nevertheless, because inflation was
repressed by the price freeze, it was difficult to gauge at the time
whether the money supply increase was excessive. There is no reliable
estimate of the elasticity of money demand with respect to expected
inflation; nor is there any reliable estimate of just how far expected
inflation had fallen. (Even if there were, it would undoubtedly be
made unreliable by the "regime change" which the Cruzado Plan repre-
sented.) By June, however, the Central Bank apparently concluded that
the low open market yields were indicating excessive liquidity, and
beginning in July it tightened liquidity and credit significantly.
The expansionary policy maintained downward pressure on interest
rates, not only in the "open market," but in the commercial bank
certificate of deposit market. Relatively low interest rates amounted
to additional fuel for aggregate demand, encouraging economic agents
to spend for consumption rather than to save. They also contributed
to a stock market boom and undoubtedly encouraged capital flight.
Rates of return on saving accounts in the housing finance system were
far lower now, since they now offered a very diluted form of indexa-
tion, and savings and loan institutions suffered leakages of funds.
Some of the funds withdrawn went into checking accounts, since the
demand for money was now higher. But on the whole, the relatively low
interest rates contributed in various ways to the overheating of the
economy and the authorities made several attempts to raise them. They
were hamstrung by their determination to keep commercial and working
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capital credit rates as low as possible, however. In June and July
the National Monetary Council added further restrictions on consumer
credit operations, intending vaguely—but never successfully— to create
a segmented credit structure in which consumer credit was expensive
and production credit was cheap.
Brazil's monetary authorities faced—and continued to face
—
troubling dilemmas in targeting interest rates. The advice they
receive, and usually claim to follow, is that interest rates ought to
be "positive in real terras," especially when aggregate demand is hot.
Some of their difficulty arises from the fact that the Brazilian
public forms inflation expectations partly on the basis of interest
rates. Thus, when the monetary authority tightens policy and tries to
raise both nominal and real interest rates, the public tends to assume
that only nominal rates have risen, and raises its inflationary expec-
tations accordingly. For example, when the monetary authority intends
to discourage people from borrowing money by raising real interest
rates, it frequently fails to accomplish this; it only persuades
people that the future inflation will be higher. In order to persuade
people that it is serious, the monetary authority may have to raise
interest rates so high that it causes financial mayhem. On top of
this problem, the authorities continued to speak of responding to
excess demand by encouraging creation of new productive capacity, and
to this end they felt they had to maintain low credit rates. Only in
late June, when it became clear that aggregate demand had become too
intense, did the monetary authority make a determined effort to
tighten policy. Even then, the government tried to offset the adverse
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consequences of this tightening by setting up a National Development
Fund for investment (see below).
The External Accounts . At the moment of the Cruzado Plan Brazil
had a relatively strong external position. The exchange rate was
favorable to exports, as a consequence of the February 1983 maxi-
devaluation and the general maintenance of the crawling peg. Indus-
trial exports were particularly favored, because agricultural prices
had risen far more than industrial prices in the wake of the 1985
drought. Industrial prices had therefore lagged behind the overall
price index; the price of the dollar therefore had outpaced domestic
industrial prices. The dollar devaluation vis-a-vis some of Brazil's
trade partners helped to strengthen its export competitiveness. There
had been a substantial surplus in the balance of trade since 1983,
which enabled the country to accumulate 11 billion dollars of foreign
exchange reserves. Debt servicing was alleviated by the falling of
international interest rates, offsetting the sharp increase in commer-
cial bank, debt in 1984. The decline of the international price of
petroleum and the recession of 1981-4 helped to keep imports at a
relatively low level. In the first months of the Cruzado Plan, how-
ever, the favorable balance of payments situation was also a source of
inflationary pressure.
There is little doubt that the exchange rate was kept fixed far
too long—that the sharp increase in domestic demand and the de facto
,
if not fully measured, inflation after mid March meant that the
cruzado was increasingly overvalued. On this reasoning, once it
became obvious that as the cruzado' s overvaluation became clear to
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everyone, one-way speculation developed against it. The spectacular
rise in the parallel-market premium, from 25 percent in March 1986 to
more than 100 percent in November 1986, would seem to be clear evidence
for this view. The trade accounts deteriorated after August, not only
because exporters found domestic markets more attractive, but because
they clearly saw that the government would be compelled soon to de-
value. (Decisions to carry out export shipments are typically made
six to nine weeks before goods leave Brazilian ports, so one may infer
that exporters were reaching their conclusions as early as June 1986.)
Some observers even suggested that the larger exporters were trying to
force the government's had, purposely engaging in an "export strike"
in a bid for a better price. Much the same can be said of producers
throughout the economy, who found themselves stuck with low prices,
such as the afore-mentioned cattle raisers.
The reason the government resisted devaluing so long was that it
feared it would revive the inflation-devaluation-inflation cycle. The
external accounts were most probably a source of inflationary pressure
at the time of the Cruzado Plan. Since early 1984 Brazil's merchan-
dise trade surplus had been running at roughly US $1 billion a month,
and while this was a good thing in that it enabled Brazil to cover its
external interest bill with no "new money" requirement, it was also a
source of inflationary pressure. There are several perspectives from
which to see this, but the clearest is probably the consideration that
the surplus of net exports of goods and final services was running
just slightly below that of merchandise trade, at between 3 and 5 per-
cent of GDP. This was a substantial contribution to aggregate demand,
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particularly in view of the fact that it had been running in the years
before 1983 at about 2 percent of GDP. Since Brazil's net-unrequited-
transfer accounts are insignificant, the surplus in net exports of
goods and final services gives the approximate national accounts
measure of the external dissaving being carried out by Brazil's econ-
omy.
The real effective exchange rate calculated by the Central Bank, is
a problematic guide to whether the new currency was undervalued at the
moment of the Cruzado Plan, for it was heavily influenced by movements
among convertible currencies early in 1986. Nevertheless, the fact
that the external accounts were strong combined with the fact that
industry had been heavily favored by the crawling-peg policy in the
early part of the year suggests that it probably was.
Brazil's external dissaving must be judged to have been, in
itself, a source of inflationary pressure. One may argue that Brazil
ought to have increased its private and public saving to compensate
for its need to run external dissaving in order to service its exter-
nal debt—or else reduced its capital formation. In fact, Brazil did
all these things, although by the time of the Cruzado Plan it had not
done so in sufficient degree to overcome its external dissaving from
the point of view of inflationary pressure. Obviously, increasing
domestic saving is all to the good. Reducing capital formation would
have been dangerous, on the other hand, since it would worsen future
problems. Not only would it compromise the nation's future ability to
employ its growing labor force and raise productivity and living stan-
dards, but it would compromise the efficiency of production for export,
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As the Brazilian government has been pointing out in recent months,
the transfer of resources overseas through external dissaving seems
irrational from the viewpoint of global allocation of financial
resources, in that a developing economy ought to be the most profit-
able for such resources. These issues are beyond the scope of the
present discussion, however; the essential point is that the external
accounts represented a source of inflationary pressure at the moment
the Cruzado Plan was announced.
Pursuing this reasoning further, it is possible that the Cruzado
Plan might have benefitted from a slight revaluation in the months
immediately following, particularly if it were accompanied by reduc-
tions in prices that incorporated a significant exchange rate cost
component, and if it were offset by increases in lagging public sector
prices, so as to keep the overall price level unchanged. The value of
the cruzado was relatively low when it was launched, particularly in
view of the peculiar circumstances in the months just prior to the
Cruzado Plan. As noted above, the fact that the exchange rate was
devalued according to the overall inflation rate while industrial
prices generally lagged behind the inflation rate implied that manu-
facturers perceived an effective devaluation in the months leading up
to the Cruzado Plan.
If the cruzado was undervalued upon its being launched, how then
is one to explain (a) the subsequent deterioration of the trade
accounts and (b) the rising parallel market premium? The first is
straightforward. Inflationary pressure developed after the Cruzado
Plan, partly on account of the pressure from the external accounts,
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but more from internal sources, principally the wage increases. On
the whole, the wage increase was probably the most important source of
inflationary pressure, and whatever might have been done along the
lines of tightened monetary policy or combined revaluation and price
readjustment is unlikely to have sufficed to overcome the wage
pressure.
The parallel exchange market premium is a more intricate matter.
The parallel market premium had risen as high as 50 percent toward the
end of 1985, but with the Cruzado Plan it came under downward pressure.
For a period of 6 weeks after the Cruzado Plan, the parallel market
premium was maintained at 25 percent through an informal understanding
between the government and the principal dealers. Since dollar pur-
chases from the Central Bank are subject to "Financial Operations Tax"
of about 25 percent (some purchases are exempted), this premium
amounted to zero from a purchaser's point of view. In April, however,
the dealers broke the agreement, and thereafter the premium rose
sharply. The rise was not simply the consequence of anticipated deva-
luation, however. It was as much, or more, the consequence of a
highly distorted foreign exchange market subjected to the pressure of
sharply increased aggregate demand. The demand for nonofficial
foreign exchange resulted in large part from extensive prohibitions on
purchases from the Central Bank, and was aggravated by the narrowness
of Brazil's parallel market, which was estimated at the time to carry
out no more than US $2 billion a year in sales (about US $8 million
per business day). If the government had devalued the cruzado early
on, these distortions would all have remained. The pressure on the
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parallel market premium would have been reduced only slightly, if at
all, to the extent that the premium resulted from distortions rather
than expectations of devaluation. Pressure on the parallel market
premium resulted from such consequences of higher income levels as
demand for foreign microcomputers, imports of which were banned under
the "market reserve" policy and heavy overseas travel—Brazilian
travellers could make only limited foreign exchange purchases at the
official exchange rate. It also resulted from the so-called
"Portuguese exchange:" coffee exports had to be made at the official
minimum "registration price," which Brazil maintained in order to put
upward pressure on world prices; some exporters found that in order to
conclude sales in a softening world market they had to provide illicit
rebates to foreign purchasers, means of paying which had to come from
the parallel market. Yet another source of pressure was the drought,
which reduced output of crops exported through illegal channels for
cash; part of the soybean crop, for example, is exported illegally,
and the drought therefore implied reduced supply of foreign exchange
to the parallel market. There is no doubt that one-way speculation
against the cruzado and capital flight—stimulated by higher incomes
and the suspension of financial indexation—took on increasing impor-
tance over time. Once the markets concluded that devaluation was in-
evitable, of course, the premium soared speculatively. Nevertheless,
in evaluating the parallel market premium as an indicator of exchange
rate misalignment, the "real" distortions must be taken into
19
account
.
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The Breakdown of the Cruzado Plan
In July the government made a half-hearted attempt to cope with
some of the accumulated problems. Monetary policy was significantly
tightened. To increase investment and decrease consumption, the
government imposed a 25 percent tax on international travel and insti-
tuted a compulsory savings scheme which included a 30 percent "forced
loan" on new cars and a 28 percent "forced loan" on gasoline. These
were considered by the government to be loans (forced savings), since
they were to be returned to the consumers of these products in the
form of equity shares in a new National Development Fund. The govern-
ment therefore excluded them from the official inflation measures.
The resources of the fund were to be invested in development projects
outlined in a simultaneously published "Targets Plan." The net result
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would presumably be a higher investment/GDP ratio and a higher
aggregate saving/GDP ratio. The basic point of the policy package,
sometimes called "the little Cruzado Plan," was to cool aggregate
demand, to capture savings and to promote investments.
The real crisis of the Cruzado Plan emerged in the external
accounts. By mid-1986 it was clear that the capital account of the
balance of payments had reversed dramatically. Net direct foreign
investment, which had totalled US $800 million in what was regarded as
a disappointing performance during 1985, totalled only US $15 million
in the first six months of 1986. Profit remittances and capital flight
were rising, one apparent sign of which was the rising "parallel" ex-
change market premium. Although the government released its inter-
national reserve figures with a six-month lag under a policy set in
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1985, private observers inferred significant reserve losses and hence
an imminent maxi-devaluation. Apart from a slight devaluation (1.8%)
in mid October, the government resisted devaluation because elections
were imminent. Exports fell rapidly, however, as would-be exporters
awaited devaluation and found domestic markets relatively lucrative.
The government's refusal to consider any price realignment was
probably motivated by two considerations. First, since the freeze
came to symbolize the political success of the plan, President Sarney
was reluctant to tamper with it, at least until after the crucial
November elections to the new constituent assembly. Second, because
the Cruzado Plan allowed wages to automatically rise every time the
accumulated inflation from each labor category's annual "base date"
reached 20 percent, policymakers were afraid to permit price increases
which might activate the "trigger."
Shortly after winning the November 15 elections, however, the
government announced another dramatic adjustment program, which
rapidly came to be called the Cruzado II. Its focus was a realignment
of prices of "middle class" consumer products and increases in taxes
on them. Automobile prices were raised by 80 percent; public utility
prices by 35 percent; fuels by 60 percent; cigarettes and alcoholic
beverages by 100 percent; sugar by 60 percent; milk an dairy products
by 100 percent. A crawling peg exchange rate devaluation was reinsti-
tuted, and new tax incentives for savers were introduced. These
measures were intended to cool consumption expenditures. Unfortu-
nately, as a number of economists warned at the time, the price
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increases tended to divert consumption expenditures rather than stimu-
late savings.
Inflation revived in the wake of these measures. Wages rose as
the automatic trigger mechanism began to function. In December 1986
consumer prices rose 7.7 percent and in January 1987 they rose 17.8
percent. These recorded price increases still did not reflect the
widespread use of price premia ("agios") which made many prices much
higher than the officially quoted ones. In the following months the
inflationary explosion continued, reaching 14 percent in March, 19
percent in April and 26 percent in May. Thus, by the middle of 1987
the yearly rate of inflation was well over 1,000 percent. Infla-
tionary expectations—and uncertainty—recovered with a vengeance, and
annualized short-term interest rates reached nearly 2,000 percent in
early June 1987. Finally, the Central Bank's international reserve
position had fallen so far that the government found it necessary to
declare a unilateral moratorium on February 20, 1987.
The "Cruzado 11" and the revival of inflation engendered severe
instability in Brazil's domestic financial markets, dramatically
demonstrating their peculiar sensitivity to inflationary expectations
and uncertainty. It is clear that not only inflationary expectations,
but also inflationary uncertainty, intensified in the wake of Cruzado
II. The consequences were magnified—ironically—by the tightened
monetary policy put into effect with the new policy package. Tight
credit conditions effectively implied that lenders (i.e., purchasers
of bank certificates of deposit and economic agents placing funds in
the overnight open market) had the greater market strength. This
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implied that they were in a position to demand compensation for infla-
tionary uncertainty. Thus, for example, a lender who ordinarily
sought real compensation of (say) 1 percent per month, and who had an
expectation that inflation would run at 7 percent per month but feared
that inflation might turn out 9 percent, might insist on being compen-
sated on the basis of the inflation he feared rather than the infla-
tion he expected, i.e., 10 percent rather than 8 percent. This con-
tributed to the volatility of inflationary expectations, to the extent
that people drew their conclusions about expected inflation on the
basis of observed interest rates. Worse, it made the recessionary
consequences of monetary tightness more severe: since inflationary
uncertainty made real interest rates higher, bankruptcies were more
likely to result from monetary tightness when credit came due.
Ironically, although the Cruzado Plan had ended financial indexa-
tion on the arguments that it contributed to inflation-feedback pres-
sure and that it maintained high real interest rate levels, many
analysts and businessmen defended its return on the grounds that in
circumstances of high inflationary uncertainty it would reduce real
interest rates. In the example given above, the lender could charge
his real interest rate plus ex post indexation; the indexation would
take the place of the provision for expected inflation and uncertainty,
but would probably turn out lower than they would have been if the
uncertainty were excessive. In any case, the argument goes, it ought
to end the vicious circle in which inflation uncertainty on the part
of lenders continually drove up interest rates. The problem with
indexation in this context, however, is that it would create severe
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risks if applied to borrowers. Because inflation is not neutral,
i.e., because particular prices rise at different rates, borrowers
have no assurance that their prices and incomes will rise as much as
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the average price level on which the indexation is based. The in-
crease in any inflation index is an average of price rises: even if
they were symmetrically distributed, roughly half of them would lag
behind their average. Recent empirical work, on Brazilian prices sug-
gests that matters may be even worse; in most of the time intervals
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studied, the median price rise was less than the average price rise.
Moreover, the dispersion of price increases is undoubtedly wider, the
higher is the inflation rate. Particularly in view of the high infla-
tion rates and high dispersion characterizing Brazil's economy by
early 1987, full financial indexation might have been perilous. In
any event, interest rates rose high enough to cause calamitous prob-
lems for many enterprises, especially those set up in the euphoria
following the Cruzado Plan. Bankruptcy proceedings reached record
levels throughout Brazil in the first half of 1987.
A partial sort of indexation was introduced in early 1987: the
classes of government obligations and savings instruments that had
been index-linked before the Cruzado Plan were now officially linked
to the overnight market rate. As noted above, the Central Bank
actively manipulates the overnight rate. Although the government has
strongly indicated that it plans to ensure that the overnight rate
yields a "positive real" rate of return, it has not legally pledged
itself to do so. Accordingly, the "financial indexation" now in
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effect is rather more "partial" in character than the financial index-
ation practiced before the Cruzado Plan—which was itself heavily
diluted by various means.
External Debt
Brazil's difficult relationship with its external creditors was
never far in the background as the consequences of the Cruzado Plan
were played out. The sharp improvement in Brazil's trade account
during 1984 enabled the country to cover its interest bill, and so to
use the proceeds of the "involuntary" 1984 commercial bank new money
facility to rebuild its international reserves. Negotiations to
restructure Brazil's commercial bank, debt collapsed in early 1985,
however, because—after repeated interruptions—Brazil had fallen out
of compliance with its 1983 Extended Fund Facility IMF program at the
end of 1984. The new government that took office in March 1985 ruled
out further IMF arrangements, which had become unpopular even by Latin
American standards. As a consequence, no new credit facilities could
be negotiated with commercial banks during 1985 and 1986. In March
1986 the commercial banks agreed to reschedule unpaid 1985 maturities
and to roll over 1986 maturities into 1987 (since 1982 it has become a
commonplace that no one seriously expects Brazil to make amortization
payments)
.
The government's refusal to consider a new IMF program also led to
difficulties with the Paris Club. The new government backed its demand
for a multi-year rescheduling by suspending debt service to Paris Club
creditors from June 1985 through April 1986; since the Paris Club
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refused to consider a multi-year rescheduling without an IMF agree-
ment, relations between Brazil and the Paris Club worsened. In May
1986, however, Brazil resumed interest payments on its Paris Club
debt. In January 1987 it secured a rescheduling agreement from the
Paris Club, with a promise to "enhanced contacts" with the IMF. This
meant acceptance, in mid 1987, of a series of IMF missions.
Brazil's capital account remained stable enough during 1985, but
in the first half of 1986 problems developed as net direct foreign
investment fell from US $800 million a year to virtually zero. In the
second half of the year it turned negative. The trade surplus con-
tinued to cover the interest bill until raid 1986, but thereafter,
reserve loss quickened, leading to the suspension of interest payments
to commercial banks in February 1987. Since then, in effect, Brazil
has financed its interest bill by accumulating arrears.
Evaluation
The Cruzado Plan's basic purpose was to eliminate the "inertial"
part of Brazil's inflation, which government economists professed to
believe was the essential explanation of the country's persistent
inflation. No doubt, Brazil's inflation had become increasingly in-
ertial as indexing, both formal and informal, had spread, resulting in
a situation in which each economic agent had the power to maintain its
relative position in the economy. The situation could be characterized
as a "permanent stalemated fight for purchasing power shares." There
seemed only two ways out. One was an orthodox stabilization policy,
which could succeed permanently only if certain socio-economic groups
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could be aade to absorb a decline in their share of the national
income. The other way was the creation of a social consensus, which
would stop the "fight for shares." The Cruzado Plan amounted to an
attempt to choose the second way. The general frustration with an
endless triple digit inflation and the boldness of the price-f reeze-
cum-new-currency created a temporary social consensus in which even
those agents that were disadvantaged at the time of the freeze were
willing to accept a sacrifice.
The Plans' failure may be ascribed to several causes. The most
important was the wage increase granted at the Plan's inception. It
swelled aggregate demand at a moment when the economy was already hot,
aggravated by external and public-sector dissaving. In retrospect, it
may be that the Plan was fatally flawed; but subsequent errors in the
Plan's execution made matters worse. The money supply assuredly grew
too rapidly at the outset. Once the Plan failed, the government clung
far too long to the price freeze and to the fixed exchange rate. The
freeze stopped the workings of the price mechanism and caught a large
segment of the economy in too sharply disadvantageous a relative-price
position. The basic error was the rigid adherence to the idea of zero
inflation. One could hardly expect the disadvantaged sectors of the
economy to accept their sacrifices for more than three or four months.
Selective price readjustments, with an emphasis on low rather than
zero inflation, might have kept the gradual spread of "agios" and
shortages on a much lower level. Also, many problems related to un-
favorable relative price position of public enterprises might have
been prevented by increasing rates in advance of the freeze or, as
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with the private sector, gradually readjusting those tariffs after the
freeze.
In order for "zero inflation" or anything like it to work, of
course, some prices have to fall. It is a revealing characteristic of
Brazil's economy that—agricultural commodities apart—the very notion
that a particular price might decline seems antiquated. It appears
clear in retrospect that the government's basic dilemma was that it
was determined to have zero inflation but needed to realign relative
prices. This would only have been possible if it could reduce some
prices. It belabors the obvious to say that an economy with well-
developed inflation-feedback mechanisms and extremely sticky downward
prices has little hope of permanently rooting out inflation.
t
DistAutionally , the Cruzado Plan favored the wage earning class,
which was the opposite of what usually occurs in classic stabilization
programs. Redistribution of income from capital to labor set into
motion contradictory forces. It caused a substantial increase in the
demand for consumer goods. The industrial capitalist sector responded
by increasing output, even though unit profits were declining for many
firms on account of the combination of the price freeze and increased
wage costs. It is likely that some firms were able to maintain ade-
quate profit levels through economies of scale resulting from larger
production runs, although profitability came under pressure later in
1986. This may explain the increased investment, although it appar-
ently consisted more of installation of additional machinery rather
than extensive new factory construction. As the "freeze" melted,
however, it is likely that capital's share recovered.
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Conclusion
The Cruzado Plan failed rather definitely, and the costs of the
failure were high. The economic costs were bad enough: they included
the international reserve loss leading to the interest moratorium,
the nasty inflationary resurgence at the end of the year, and the
sharp decline in labor purchasing power, leading to incipient reces-
sion in the first half of 1987. In many ways the political price was
even higher, not merely for the particular personalities in power, but
for the "political morale" of the nation. Many Brazilians feel that
the whole exercise was a crude political manipulation: prices were
frozen long enough to enable a weak, unpopular government to win its
legislative election, then turned loose in the Cruzado II program
—
which followed the elections by less than a week. The government
appeared, in turn, to be as vacillating, as manipulative, as deceptive
as the preceding military regime. (For example, it altered the funda-
mental structure of the consumer price index to suit its current needs
23five times between November 1985 and November 1986.)
Many observers have concluded that the Cruzado Plan's failure
shows that "heterodox" inflation shocks cannot really work, that only
an orthodox program of fiscal and monetary control can ever end
Brazil's chronic inflation. At best, the argument goes, a heterodox
shock can be helpful if accompanied by appropriate fiscal, monetary
and exchange rate measures and if the price freeze is rapidly con-
cluded. This essay has argued that the matter is rather more compli-
cated than this seemingly unobjectionable argument makes it sound.
The Cruzado Plan experience, one may argue, was not a clean test of a
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heterodox stabilization program: the wage increase, given in conjunc-
tion with the Cruzado Plan, was destabilizing; it was simply far too
large for the price level to resist, even for an economy growing as
fast as Brazil's. The wage increase was undoubtedly the largest mis-
take, and in retrospect it doomed the Cruzado Plan from the start. No
conceivable amount of fiscal tightening—or reductions in other aspects
of aggregate demand, such as net exports or capital formation—could
have overcome the consequences of the resulting consumption spurt.
There were further policy miscalculations: the price freeze was main-
tained too long from an economic (if not a short-term political)
viewpoint; relative prices badly needed realignment from the outset;
monetary policy was loosened too rapidly. More controversially, this
essay has argued that the exchange rate may initially have been under-
valued, and this generated some inflationary pressure, although the
sharp external accounts deterioration suggests that it subsequently
became overvalued. No less controversially, this essay has argued
that the persisting public sector deficit was relatively less impor-
tant as a cause of the Cruzado Plan's breakdown; although to be sure,
realignment of public enterprise and tighter fiscal policy would have
helped matters.
Since the fatal wage increase was not part of the stabilization
program per se
,
a theorist may argue that the Cruzado Plan experience
is not definitive evidence against heterodox stabilization. It is
just possible the Cruzado Plan would have worked, or would have worked
better, if real wages had not been raised 8 percent (and more). This
is a troubling argument, however. As noted, workers whose wages had
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just been increased would have had to accept reduced money wages in
order to avoid that wage increase. One must ask.—as Brazil's presi-
dent undoubtedly did—whether that was feasible on political grounds.
It might have been more feasible not to give a wage increase to
workers who recently had had one, but this might have been viewed as
unfair: it would have changed the relative wage distribution in an
arbitrary way.
It might have been possible for the government to avoid providing
the real wage increase if the Cruzado Plan had been done in a somewhat
different way. If the problem was that money wage cuts were out of
the question, the government might have circumvented the difficulty by
raising all prices generally by a large percentage before freezing
them. This would have enabled it to raise all money wages so as to
set their real values equal to the average of their real values over
the preceding six months. It might even have been possible for the
government to take advantage of such a general price rise to reset the
real values of the prices it meant to freeze— for example, so as to
set them equal to their average real values over the preceding six
months. This would undoubtedly have set the price array equal to
something closer to an equilibrium value than simply freezing them
accomplished. Even so, one lesson of the Cruzado Plan price freeze is
that it would probably have been sensible to keep readjusting prices
after the freeze—but raising and lowering prices with each adjust-
ment, so that the overall price level did not rise. If the government
had chosen such a strategy of raising all prices before freezing them,
it would immediately have made money and nonindex-linked financial
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assets scarce. The money supply would have had to increase by even
more in order to meet higher money demand; but, on the other hand, the
monetary authority would have had more leeway in which to allow a
money-supply increase without reaching the threshold at which it was
inflationary.
On June 12, 1987, with resurgent inflation running at nearly 1,500
percent a year, Brazil attempted yet another heterodox shock. This
time, the government's stated ambitions were more modest. There was
no promise of "zero inflation," only a more realistic hope of reduced
inflationary pressure. The price freeze was clearly advertised as
temporary. By this time, the external accounts had begun to recover,
but the fiscal deficit had deteriorated sharply, mainly because prices
had accelerated so sharply in early 1987—setting off the wage trigger
repeatedly—that the collection lag had become severe, wage bills had
ballooned, and financial charges for public debt had become a special
crisis in itself for state and municipal governments. No wage in-
crease was given, although the inflation had driven real wages well
below their levels at the end of 1985. The Cruzado was devalued, how-
ever, by approximately 10 percent. At this writing, it appears un-
likely that the "Bresser Plan" (as it has come to be known, since its
principal author was the Finance Minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser
Pereira) will permanently reverse the inflation rate. The problem was
the devaluation: once again, just as the government accompanied the
Cruzado Plan stabilization with an inflationary wage shock, it now
accompanied the Bresser Plan with an inflationary devaluation. With
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the trade surplus reaching monthly records in June and July, the mone-
tary base inevitably came under severe pressure, growing approximately
28 percent in July and probably at a similar rate in August. Once
again, the heterodox approach has not had a fair test: when carrying
out heterodox stabilization, it is essential to avoid concurrent in-
flationary shocks, however necessary they are deemed to be.
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firms from passing along to prices the increase in costs that would
follow a devaluation. . ." He therefore concluded that ". . . Brazil
will have to follow a fixed exchange regime for months to come." Maia
Gomes (May 1986, pp. 31-2).
20„
Controversy arose over whether the compulsory loans should be
incorporated into the consumer price index as if they were taxes.
Arguing that the loans did not amount to a real price increase because
the consumer would be repaid with participatory shares in the National
Development Fund, the government decided to exclude them from its com-
putation of the inflation raLe.
21
Baer and Beckerman (1980).
22
Moura Silva and Kadota (1982).
23
See Modiano (1986) and various issues of Conjuntura Economica .
24
For an evaluation of the Cruzado Plan's failure by various
policymakers involved in its conception and administration, see:
Sardenberg (1987) and Solnik (1987).
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lab! e 1
Brazil: Measures of C rout h and In flat ion
,
1970-1986
i[yearly growth rates)
GDP
Out
Industry
put
ricultu re General Wholesal
Prices
e Consumer
GDP
Deflate:
1970 8.8 10. A 1.0 19.8 19.4 20.9
1971 11.3 12.0 11.3 18.7 20.0 18.1 20. A
1972 12.1 13.0 4.1 16.8 17.7 14.0 19.5
1973 14.0 16.3 3.6 16.2 16.2 13.0 22.6
1974 9.0 9.2 8.2 33.8 34.1 33.8 34.3
1975 3.2 5.9 4.8 30.1 30.6 31.2 33.9
1976 10.1 12.A 2.9 48.2 48.1 44.8 47.4
1977 4.5 3.9 11.8 38.6 35.3 43.1 46.2
1978 4. 7 ?.: -2.6 40.5 42.3 38.7 38. S
1979 7.2 6.
A
5.0 76.8 79.5 76.0 55.6
1980 9.1 7.3 6.3 110.2 100.8 86.3 91.7
1981 -3.4 -5.5 6.4 95.2 112.8 100.6 102.5
1982 0.9 0.6 -2.5 99.7 97.6 101.8 92.9
1983 -2.5 -6.8 2.2 211.0 234.0 177.9 151.9
1984 5.7 6.0 3.2 223.8 230.3 208.7 210.5
1985 8.3 9.0 8.8 235.1 225.7 248.5 234.8
1986 8.2 12.1 -7.3 65.0 62.6 83.5 142.4
Source: Conjuntura Econooiica
Table 2
Brazil: Monthly Price Changes
General Prices Wholesale
Monthly Yearly Monthly
1986
January 17.8 250.4 19.0
February 22.4 289.4 22.2
March -1.0 242.5 -1.0
April -0.58 217.5
-1.46
May 0.32 195.6 0.09
June 0.53 175.5 0.37
July 0.63 154.6 0.58
August 1.33 126.3 1.34
September 1.09 109.6 0.67
October 1.4 94.8 1.15
November 2.5 73.7 2.1
December 7.6 65.0 7.7
1987
January 12.0 57.0 10.5
February 14.1 55.8 10.4
March 15.0 69.8 14.1
April 20.1 105.1 21.0
May 27.7 160.8 30.7
June 25.9 226.5 26.3
Consumer Prices
Monthly
15.7
21.8
-0.3
1.1
0.79
0.62
0.58
0.88
0.95
1.01
2.1
7.5
14.3
14.5
13.5
21.5
25.1
27.2
Source: Conjuntura Econoolca.
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Table 3
a) Industrial Production
(Yearly Growth Rates )
Manufac- Capital Intermediate Consumer
Industry turing Goods Goods Dur NonDur
1986
January 8.3 8.2 11.4 7.2 14.3 8.3
February 9.1 9.0 12.7 7.8 17.1 9.3
March 8.6 8.4 11.6 7.3 17.4 8.7
April 9.8 9.7 15.2 8.1 23.5 8.8
May 10.6 10.6 17.8 8.3 30.7 9.1
June 11.5 11.6 20.8 8.7 33.5 9.9
July 11.7 11.8 21.3 8.8 30.6 10.2
August 11.7 11.8 21.7 8.7 30.0 10.0
September 11.7 11.9 22.0 8.7 27.8 10.4
October 11.4 11.7 22.1 8.6 24.5 10.0
November 11.3 11.7 22.2 8.6 21.5 10.1
December 10.9 11.3 21.6 8.4 20.3 8.9
1987
January 10.5 10.9 21.1 8.1 18.8 8.1
February 10.5 11.0 20.4 8.2 17.1 8.3
March 11.4 11.9 20.8 9.1 15.0 9.5
April 10.6 11.1 17.7 8.7 10.6 9.6
May 10.1 10.7 16.1 8.6 4.8 9.5
b) Use of Industrial Capacity
January
February
July
November
Source: Conjuntura Economica .
1984 1985 1986 1987
72 77 81 84
74 77 81 83
74 77 82
76 80 86
-50-
Table 4
a) Brazil Yearly Indicators
(billions of US $)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Exports
12.1
12.7
15.2
20.1
23.7
20.2
21.9
27.0
25.6
22.4
Imports
-12.0
-13.7
-18.0
-23.0
-22.1
-19.4
-15.4
-13.9
-13.2
-12.9
Trade
Balance
+ 0.1
- 1.0
- 2.8
- 2.9
+ 1.6
+ 0.8
+ 6.5
+13.1
+12.4
+ 9.5
Net
Interest
Payments
- 2.5
- 3.3
- 5.3
- 7.5
-10.3
-12.5
-10.3
-11.4
-11.2
Current
Account
Balance
- 4.1
- 5.9
-10.7
-12.8
-11.7
-16.3
- 6.8
+ 0.1
- 0.1
Reserves
+ 7.3
+11.9
+ 9.7
+ 6.9
+ 7.5
+ 4.0
+ 4.6
+12.0
+11.6
+ 6.8
1986
b) Brazil: Monthly Foreign Economic Indicators
Exchange Rate Exports Imports
(Cruzado per US $) (in millions of US $)
Trade
Balance
January 11.31 1,909.6 1,208.6 (475)* 701.0
February 13.07 <; 36.5%)+ 1,751.2 1,123.0 (387)* 628.2
March 13.84 ( ; 26.4%)+ 2,157.3 1,021.1 (238)* 1 ,136.2
April 13.84 ( ; 36.0%)+ 2,171.5 880.4 (142)* 1 ,291.1
May 13.84 |; 49.2%)+ 2,291.8 951.3 (224)* 1 ,340.5
June 13.84 <; 49.0%)+ 2,000.3 928.7 (186)* 1 ,071.8
July 13.84 ( ; 59.8%)+ 2,209.1 1,175.3 (225)* 1 ,033.8
August 13.24 ( ; 69.8%)+ 2,098.9 1,076.4 (191)* 1 ,022.5
September 13.84 l; 69.1%)+ 1,857.0 1,017.0 (195)* 840.6
October 13.97 i: 86.7%)+ 1,340.0 1,130.0 (205)* 210.0
November 14.11 :i04.5%) + 1,300.0 1,180.0 (223)* 130.0
December 14.55 i; 88.7%)+ 1,329.0 1,173.0 (156)* 156.0
1987
January 15.70 ; 7i.8%)+ 1,259.0 1,130.0 (276)* 129.0
February 18.32 : 64.5%)+ 1,530.0 1,228.0 (271)* 302.0
March 20.65 : 5i.o%)+ 1,427.0 1,221.0 (392)* 206.0
April 23.80 C 30.0%)+ 1,660.0 1,140.0 520.0
May 30.74 2,170.0 1,224.0 946.0
June 39.90
Source
:
Conjuntura Economica
;
Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim.
*imports of oil; + in parenthesis, % of parallel rate over official
rate.
Table 5
Wholesale Prices Changes: January 1980 Co February 25, 1986
For Selected Products
(General Wholesale Price Change in Period = 42,119%)
Product
Tomatoes
Instant Coffee
Potatoes
Ground and Roasted Coffee
Animal Feeds
Raw Salt
Coffee Beans
Shock Absorbers
Fish
Radios
Mechanical Lathes
Gearboxes
Oil
Beans
Wheat Flour
Copper Wires
Portland Cement
Manioc
Construction Machinery
Canned Vegetables
Pig Iron for Foundry
Truck, and Bus Tires
Processed Wood
Refined Salt
Water-based Paints
Oil-based Paints
Acytelene
Powdered Milk
Small Trucks and Vans
Automobiles (78 to 120 HP)
Color Television Sets
LPGs
Detergents
Raw Petroleum
Diesel Oil
Air Conditioners
Meat
Refrigerators
Polishers
Washing Machines
Reinforcing Bars for Ribbed Concrete
Refined Soybean Oil
Manioc Flour
Blenders
Reinforcing Bars for Smooth Concrete
Gasoline
Industrial Soap
Milk
Percentage
Price Change
209,119
110 890
108 172
93, 211
90, 865
78 488
78 480
73 171
69 518
69 374
68 990
65 775
65 543
63 882
63 648
56 785
56 528
53 814
53 262
52 541
43 941
43 464
42 355
42 251
41 ,737
41 ,483
41 ,305
41 ,069
40 767
28 749
28 ,496
28 ,141
26 697
26 ,139
25 062
24 413
24 ,090
22 889
22 829
21 ,732
20 982
20 676
20 303
19 305
18 075
17 891
16 476
15 188
Source: Angelo Jorge de Souza, "Inflacao e Precos Relativos," in
Conjuntura Economica, Abril 1986, p. 30.
Table 6
a) Money Supply Growth Plates
(monthly growth rates)
Monetary M
l
M
2
M
3
M
4
1986 Base
-9.0 2.7 11.3January 1.0 13.0
February 12.2 14.0 14.5 15.9 16.0
March 36.0 80.1 31.9 14.4 12.0
April 35.3 19.3 6.9 1.4 1.0
May 15.0 15.3 4.4 2.6 3.0
June 10.6 13.9 8.6 5.8 4.0
July 14.1 0.4 1.4 1.7 1.0
August 6.0 6.9 19.5 12.9 5.0
September 2.8 4.8 7.4 6.4 5.0
October 5.2 6.7 10.5 7.4 4.0
November 9.
A
4.1 5.4 3.9 1.0
December 3.7 9.3 8.2 6.8
1987
January -3.6 -23.2 -10.4 -4.5
February -A. 7 7.1 7.8 13.5
March 3.0 10.9 4.1 11.9
April 10.5 -11.9 -2.9 6.6
May 5.2 11.1 9.4 17.6
b ) Brazilian National Treasury Government Cash Budget Result
(millions of Cruzados)
1986
January 14,329 June -12,357 November - 33,752
February 20,452 July -14,910 December -106,134
March 11,047 August -19,563
April -9,732 September -21,452
May -14,289 October -23,784
1987
January 447 April 15,519
February 1,706 May 9,653
March 14,629
Source: Conjuntura Economica.
Table 7
E
In
mployment
,
Unemployment and Wages
dus trial
Employment Unemployment Real Wages
(Year ly Growth) (% of Labor Force) (Yearly Growth)
1986
January 9.1 4.18 21.1
February 9.4 4.40 26.1
March 9.3 4.40 44.5
April 9.3 4.39 36.9
May 9.6 4.17 20.7
June 10.5 4.08 18.7
July 10.9 3.76 20.6
August 10.9 3.60 26.0
September 10.9 3.20 32.1
October 10.3 3.50 24.7
November 9.9 2.98 18.5
December 8.9 2.20 18.0
1987
January 8.0 3.20 5.9
February 7.6 3.30 4.1
March 6.7 3.10 4.6
April 6.4 2.80 3.8
May 3.90
Source: Conjuntura Economica
, and Banco Central do Brasll, Boletlm .
Table 8
1986
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
De cember
1987
Brazil: Interest Rates
(% per month)
Bank. Deposit Mo ne y K= r ke t
Certificate Overnight Rates
18.04 16.74
16.12 13. £3
1.42 1.13
1.50 1.25
1.83 1.24
2.08 1.1-3
2.50 1.94
3.33 2.55
3.75 2.93
A. 00 1.67
6.83 2. £5
10.83 5.30
January 40.00 27.5-3
February 17.00 15. CO
March 40.10 15.63
April 38.96 21.75
May
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim : Conjuntura Economica .
Table 9
Index of Real Prices of Price Administered Sectors
Wheat
Electric Energy
Telecommunications
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Alcohol
Steel Products
Mail and Telegr. 100 82 80 53
Source: Marques (1987), p. 42; original sources: Banco Central do
Brasil, Brasil: Progratna Economico - Ajustamento Interno
e Externo
,
Feb., 1987; Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Conjuntura
Economica
,
Jan. 1987.
Real prices obtained by deflating using the general price
index.
October November
1983 1984 1985 1986 1986
100 132 99 66 60
100 96 117 101 96
100 88 71 60 74
100 119 87 66 96
100 123 84 64 58
100 131 96 73 106
100 102 103 75 68
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